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Abstract. We give a notion of bargaining set for finite economies and show its
coincidence with the set of Walrasian allocations. Moreover, we also show that
justified objections equate with Walrasian objections. Our bargaining-Walras
equivalence provides a discrete approach to the characterization of competitive
equilibria obtained by Mas-Colell (1989) for continuum economies.
Some further results highlight whether it is possible to restrict the formation
of coalitions and still get the bargaining set. Finally, recasting some known
characterizations of Walrasian allocations, we state additional interpretations of
the bargaining set.
JEL Classification: D51, D11, D00.
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1 Introduction
The core of an economy is defined as the set of allocations which cannot be
blocked by any coalition. Thus, the veto mechanism that defines the core im-
plicitly assumes that individuals are not forward-looking. However, one may
ask whether an objection or veto is credible or, on the contrary, not consistent
enough so other agents in the economy may react to it and propose an alternative
or counter-objection.
The first outcome of this two-step conception of the veto mechanism was the
work by Aumann and Maschler (1964), who introduced the concept of bargaining
set, containing the core of a cooperative game. This original concept of bargain-
ing set was later adapted to atomless economies by Mas-Colell (1989). The main
idea is to inject a sense of credibility and stability to the veto mechanism, hence
permitting the implementation of some allocations which otherwise would be
formally blocked, although in a non-credible way. Thus, only objections with-
out counter-objections are considered as credible or justified, and consequently,
blocking an allocation becomes more difficult.
In the case of pure exchange economies with a finite number of traders the
set of Walrasian allocations is a strict subset of the core which is also strictly
contained in the bargaining set. Under conditions of generality similar to those
required in Aumann’s (1964) core-Walras equivalence theorem, Mas-Colell (1989)
showed that the bargaining set and the competitive allocations coincide for con-
tinuum economies.
Instead of starting from Aumann’s core-Walras equivalence, in this paper
we build upon the Edgeworth equilibrium notion and its coincidence with the
Walrasian allocations as shown by Debreu-Scarf’s (1963) core convergence result.
An Edgeworth equilibrium for an economy with a finite number of agents is an
attainable allocation whose r-fold repetition belongs to the core of the r-fold
replica of the original economy, for any positive integer r; it can also be defined as
an attainable allocation which cannot be blocked by a coalition with rational rates
of participation. Enlarging the set of coalitions in order to allow a participation
of the agents with any rate belonging to the real unit interval, Aubin (1979)
considered a limit notion of Edgeworth equilibrium. The core resulting from this
blocking system a` la Aubin equals the set of Walrasian allocations in economies
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with a finite set of agents.1
The Aubin core-Walras equivalence leads us to consider this limit veto in
the spirit of Edgeworth to define objections and counter-objections. Thus, we
define a concept of bargaining set for finite economies that involves not only
more possible objections but also counter-objections. Note that enlarging the
number of coalitions in this way may be a double-edged sword. Having more
coalitions implies more possibilities to object but, at the same time, produces
more ways of counter-objecting. That is, objecting becomes easier but having
a justified objection becomes harder. This highlights the fact that the overall
effect of enlarging the number of coalitions is not straightforward.
It could appear that this notion is nothing but Mas-Colell’s for the particular
case of a n-types continuum economy, but it is not. There are actually conceptual
differences between both concepts with important implications regarding the
nature of justified objections. Any coalition which makes a justified Mas-Colell
objection to an allocation must contain all the agents of the type that becomes
strictly better off and therefore, if a coalition with a justified objection includes
only part of some type of agents then it is not possible for these agents to
strictly improve at the objection. These properties make the notion of a Mas-
Colell’s justified objection very stringent and his bargaining set may become
very large. In contrast, our definition of a justified objection does not require
total participation of the agents which are involved, and it also allows a member
who participates without the whole of her endowments to strictly improve at the
objection. (See the remarks after the Definition 3.1 where we deal in detail with
the main distinction between both notions).
Our first result states that the set of Walrasian allocations coincides with
this Aubin bargaining set, providing a finite approach to the characterization
obtained by Mas-Colell (1989) of competitive allocations. The connection of
the bargaining-Walras equivalence we obtain with the related literature can be
summarized in the following table:
Atomless core-Walras equivalence. Mas-Colell’s bargaining set-Walras equivalence.
economies (Aumann, 1964) (Mas-Colell, 1989)
Finite Aubin core-Walras equivalence. (Aubin) bargaining set -Walras equivalence.
economies (Aubin, 1979) This paper: Theorem 3.1.
1Florenzano (1990) extends this result to production economies without ordered preferences
defined in a Hausdorff linear topological space.
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Equivalence results for Walrasian equilibria.
The bargaining-Walras equivalence we show allows us to deduce that the bar-
gaining set we have defined is also consistent in the sense of Dutta et al. (1989)
as happens with the Mas-Colell bargaining set for atomless economies. Further-
more, we also provide a discrete approach to the characterization of justified
objections stated by Mas-Colell (1989) by means of a notion of Walrasian objec-
tions which reflects the main differences between Mas-Colell’s bargaining set and
ours. The fact that any Walrasian objection is justified and vice-versa for finite
economies, allows us to refine our bargaining-Walras equivalence and its proof in
terms of Walrasian objections.
Our result (and also Mas-Colell’s) implicitly requires the formation of all
coalitions. In other words, the bargaining set concept requires checking the
whole set of possible coalitions in order to test whether any group of agents can
improve upon an allocation by using their own resources, both in the objection
and counter-objection processes. It is usually argued that the costs arising from
forming a coalition are not at all negligible; incompatibilities among different
agents may appear and a large amount of information and communication might
be needed to really get together a coalition. This idea leads us to study the
possibility of restricting the formation of coalitions by assuming that not all the
parameters, which specify the degree of participation of agents when they become
members of a coalition, are admissible. Then, we analyze the consequences that
this condition has with regard to the bargaining set solution. We show that
both for objections and counter-objections, the participation rates of the agents
can be restricted to those arbitrarily small without changing the bargaining set.
However, we show that this does not hold if we consider parameters close enough
to complete participation. We also prove that the participation rates in the
counter-objection system can be restricted to rational numbers, which is the
veto power we get when the economy is enlarged via replicas.
Finally, we try to make the best use of our results by recasting in terms of
the bargaining set some characterizations of the Walrasian allocations already
present throughout the literature. First, we focus on a result by Herve´s-Beloso,
Moreno-Garc´ıa and Yannelis (2005) that characterizes Walrasian allocations as
those that are not blocked by the coalition formed by all the agents in a collection
of perturbed economies. Then, we revisit the approach followed by Herve´s-
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Beloso and Moreno-Garc´ıa (2009), who showed that Walrasian equilibria can
be identified by using a non-cooperative two-player game. Both equivalence
theorems constitute now additional characterizations of the bargaining set for
finite economies.
The rest of the work is structured as follows. In Section 2 we collect notations
and preliminaries. In Section 3, a bargaining-Walras equivalence and a charac-
terization of justified objections via Walrasian objections are provided. Section 4
elaborates on the possibility of restricting the coalitions that are allowed to form
and still get the bargaining set. In Section 5, specific equivalence theorems for
Walrasian equilibrium are presented as further characterizations of the bargain-
ing sets. In order to facilitate the reading of the paper, the proofs of the results
are contained in a final Appendix.
2 Preliminaries
Let E be an exchange economy with a finite number n of agents, who trade a
finite number ` of commodities. Each consumer i has a preference relation %i on
the set of consumption bundles IR`+, with the properties of continuity, convexity
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and strict monotonicity. This implies that preferences are represented by utility
functions Ui, i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n}. Let ωi ∈ IR`++ denote the endowments of
consumer i. So the economy is E = (IR`+,%i, ωi, i ∈ N).
An allocation x is a consumption bundle xi ∈ IR`+ for each agent i ∈ N.
The allocation x is feasible in the economy E if ∑ni=1 xi ≤ ∑ni=1 ωi. A price
system is an element of the (` − 1)-dimensional simplex of IR`+. A Walrasian
equilibrium for the economy E is a pair (p, x), where p is a price system and x
is a feasible allocation such that, for every agent i, the bundle xi maximizes the
utility function Ui in the budget set Bi(p) = {y ∈ IR`+ such that p · y ≤ p · ωi}.
We denote by W (E) the set of Walrasian allocations for the economy E .
A coalition is a non-empty set of consumers. An allocation y is said to be
attainable or feasible for the coalition S if
∑
i∈S yi ≤
∑
i∈S ωi. Let x ∈ IR`n+ be
a feasible allocation in the economy E . The coalition S blocks x if there exists
2The convexity of preferences we require is the following: If a consumption bundle z is
strictly preferred to zˆ so is the convex combination λz + (1 − λ)zˆ for any λ ∈ (0, 1). This
convexity property is weaker than strict convexity and it holds, for instance, when the utility
functions are concave.
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an allocation y which is attainable for S, such that yi %i xi for every i ∈ S
and yj j xj for some member j in S. A feasible allocation is efficient if it is
not blocked by the grand coalition, formed by all the agents. The core of the
economy E , denoted by C(E), is the set of feasible allocations which are not
blocked by any coalition of agents.
It is known that, under the hypotheses above, the economy E has Walrasian
equilibrium and that any Walrasian allocation belongs to the core (in particular,
it is efficient). Moreover, the blocking power of coalitions in finite economies
is not able to eliminate every non-Walrasian allocation. Therefore, in order to
characterize the Walrasian equilibria in terms of the core, we have to enlarge
the set of coalitions or, alternatively, increase somehow their veto power. This
line of arguments has been carried out in different ways. For instance, Aubin
(1979) extended the notion of ordinary veto by allowing members to participate
with a portion of their endowments when joining a coalition. We refer to this
veto system as Aubin veto or veto in the sense of Aubin. An allocation x is
blocked in the sense of Aubin by the coalition S via the allocation y if there exist
coefficients αi ∈ (0, 1], for each i ∈ S, such that (i)
∑
i∈S αiyi ≤
∑
i∈S αiωi, and
(ii) yi %i xi, for every i ∈ S and yj j xj for some j ∈ S. The Aubin core of the
economy E , denoted by CA(E), is the set of all feasible allocations which cannot
be blocked in the sense of Aubin. Under the standard assumptions stated above,
Aubin (1979) showed that CA(E) = W (E).
As with the core, the Aubin core does not assess the “credibility” of the
objections; any attainable allocation which is blocked by a coalition is dismissed.
The argument that objections might be met with counter-objections leads to
bargaining set notions. Since the original bargaining set notion was introduced by
Aumann and Maschler (1964) for cooperative games, several versions have been
defined and studied. More specifically, Mas-Colell (1989) defined the bargaining
set for atomless economies.3 The idea of the definition is that this set contains
all the feasible allocations of the economy that are not blocked in a credible,
justified way. Recently, the original bargaining set was extended by Yang, Liu
and Liu (2011) to Aubin bargaining sets for games which they refer to as convex
cooperative fuzzy games. Shortly after, Liu and Liu (2012) gave a modification
of the previous extension and obtained both existence and equivalence results
3Mas-Colell (1989) not only adapted the original concept of bargaining set to atomless
economies but also proved, under conditions of generality similar to the Aumann’s (1964) core
equivalence theorem, that the bargaining set and the set of competitive allocations coincide.
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with other cooperative solutions. However, they remarked that finding a proper
definition of the Aubin bargaining set is not an easy task.
In the next section, we provide a concept of bargaining set by means of the
Aubin veto instead of the usual blocking mechanism. Thus, we extend and adapt
the notions of bargaining sets recently provided by Yang, Liu and Liu (2011) and
Liu and Liu (2012) for (transferable utility) cooperative games to finite exchange
economies. In addition, we will use the fact that, regarding Walrasian equilibria,
a finite economy E with n consumers is equivalent to a continuum economy Ec
with n-types of agents as we specify below.
Consider a continuum economy where the set of agents is represented by the
unit real interval [0, 1] endowed with the Lebesgue measure µ (as in Aumann,
1964). There are only a finite number of types of consumers. Thus, I = [0, 1] =⋃m
i=1 Ii, with µ(Ii) = ni/n (i.e., µ(Ii) is a rational number).
4 Every t ∈ Ii has
the same endowments ωi and preference %i, that is, all the consumers in Ii are of
the same type i. Note that we can write Ii =
⋃ni
j=1 Iij with µ(Iij) = 1/n for every
i, j. Consider now a finite economy with n agents and ni consumers of each type
i. Note that a feasible allocation x = (x1, . . . , xn), with xi = (xij, j = 1, . . . , ni),
in the finite economy defines a feasible allocation fx in the continuum economy
which is given by fx(t) = xij for every t ∈ Iij. Reciprocally, a feasible allocation f
in the continuum economy defines a feasible allocation xf in the finite economy
which is given by xfij =
1
µ(Iij)
∫
Iij
f(t)dµ(t). Moreover, x (respectively f) is an
equal-treatment allocation if and only if fx (respectively x
f ) also is.
Under continuity and convexity of preferences, if (x, p) is a Walrasian equi-
librium in the n-agent economy, then (fx, p) is a competitive allocation in the
n-types continuum economy. Conversely, if (f, p) is a competitive equilibrium
in the continuum economy then (xf , p) is a Walrasian equilibrium in the finite
economy. (See Garc´ıa-Cutr´ın and Herve´s-Beloso, 1993).
Consider now the economy E that we have defined at the beginning of this
section. Let Ec be the associated continuum economy, where the set of agents
is I = [0, 1] =
⋃n
i=1 Ii,where Ii =
[
i−1
n
, i
n
)
if i 6= n; In =
[
n−1
n
, 1
]
; and all the
agents in the subinterval Ii are of the same type i. In this particular case, x =
(x1, . . . , xn) is a Walrasian allocation in the finite economy E if and only if the step
4Without loss of generality one can take Ii = [ai, ai+1), for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1}; with
a1 = 0, ai+1 − ai = ni/n and Im = [am, 1]. Equivalently, we can also take I = [0, n] and
Ii = [ni−1, ni−1 + ni), for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}; with n0 = 0 and Im = [nm−1, n].
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function fx (defined by fx(t) = xi for every t ∈ Ii) is a competitive allocation
in the continuum economy Ec. In short, the initial finite economy E and the
associated continuum economy Ec are equivalent regarding market equilibrium.
3 A bargaining-Walras equivalence for finite
economies
In economies with a continuum of agents that trade a finite number of commodi-
ties, the competitive equilibrium is not only characterized by the core (Aumann,
1964), but also by the bargaining set (Mas-Colell, 1989). The Mas-Colell bar-
gaining set is well defined for finite economies and, in this case, it can be larger
than the core (see example in Section 6 in Mas-Colell, 1989).
To specify the notion of the Mas-Colell bargaining set for the finite economy E ,
let x be a feasible allocation that is blocked by a coalition S via the allocation y.
Thus, the objection (S, y) to x has a counter-objection if there exists a coalition
T and an attainable allocation z for T such that zi i yi for every i ∈ T ∩S and
zi i xi for every i ∈ T \ S, where T \ S is the set of agents which are in T but
not in S.
An objection which cannot be counter-objected is said to be justified. Thus,
the Mas-Colell bargaining set of an economy contains all the feasible allocations
which, if they are objected (or blocked), could also be counter-objected. Let
BMC(E) denote the Mas-Colell bargaining set for the economy E with n con-
sumers.
3.1 A bargaining set notion for finite economies
In this section we provide a definition of bargaining set for finite economies using
Aubin’s veto mechanism that will allow us to prove that the set of Walrasian
allocations and the bargaining set coincide.
An Aubin objection to x in the economy E is a pair (S, y), where S is a coalition
that blocks x via y in the sense of Aubin. Note that the coalition S can be also
defined by the parameters which specify the participation of its members.
An Aubin counter-objection to the objection (S, y) is a pair (T, z), where T is
a coalition and z is an allocation defined on T, for which there exist λi ∈ (0, 1]
9
for each i ∈ T , such that:
(i)
∑
i∈T λizi ≤
∑
i∈T λiωi,
(ii) zi i yi for every i ∈ T ∩ S and
(iii) zi i xi for every i ∈ T \ S.
Remark. Consider that the parameters defining the participations rates of
each member in a blocking coalition S are rational numbers. Then, there are
natural numbers ai, i ∈ S and r ≥ max{ai, i ∈ S}, such that λi = ai/r for every
i ∈ S. That is, we can say that the blocking coalition is formed by ai agents of
type i. Therefore, when the participation rates are rational numbers, the veto
mechanism in the sense of Aubin is the standard veto system in sequence of
replicated economies.
From now on in this section and in the related proofs, every time we are in a
finite economy framework and write block, objection, counter-objection, or any
other concept related with a veto system, we refer to those notions in the sense
of Aubin unless stated otherwise.
Definition 3.1 A feasible allocation belongs to the (Aubin) bargaining set of the
finite economy if it has no justified objection. A justified objection is an objection
that has no counter-objection.
We denote by B(E) the bargaining set of the economy E as we have defined
above. Note that W (E) = CA(E) ⊆ B(E).
Our notion of bargaining set differs from the one by Mas-Colell. To clarify this
point, let us highlight the main differences between the sets BMC(E) and B(E).
In our definition agents can join a coalition for objection or counter-objection
process, with a part of their initial endowments. That is, regarding the bar-
gaining system, agents can cooperate with different participation levels and the
attainable bundles depend on these degrees of involvement. Furthermore, when-
ever an agent i is assigned the commodity bundle yi within a coalition involved
in an objection, if she also joins a coalition for a counter-objection, then she nec-
essarily needs to be assigned a bundle that improves her upon yi, independently
10
of the rate of participation of agent i in the coalition.5 This fact embodies one of
the main conceptual differences between the Mas-Colell bargaining set and the
bargaining set using the veto mechanism in the sense of Aubin.
To be precise, considering the notion of the Mas-Colell bargaining set, if a
coalition with a justified objection includes only part of some type of agents
then it is not possible for these agents to strictly improve at the objection.6
This is not the case with our notion of justified objections. In particular, if we
have a justified objection (S, y) to the allocation x in a finite economy E , with
rates of participation λi, i ∈ S, then the pair (S˜, y˜) given by any coalition S˜
in the associated continuum economy Ec, such that the set of members in S˜ of
type i (denoted by S˜i) has measure λi, and y˜(t) = yi for every t ∈ S˜i, is an
objection to the step allocation fx in Ec, although it is not necessarily a justified
objection. Basically, this contrast is due to the somehow leadership condition
that a type obtains whenever any agent of such a type takes part in an objection,
independently of the degree of participation.
3.2 A bargaining-Walras equivalence result
The bargaining set we consider constitutes indeed an adequate way of “enlarging”
the economy, allowing us to characterize Walrasian allocations in finite economies
as allocations with no justified objections. To this end, we show a preliminary
result that we will use in the proof of our bargaining-Walras equivalence for
economies with a finite number of consumers.
Lemma 3.1 Let x be an allocation in E . If (S, g) is a justified objection (in the
sense of Mas-Colell) to fx in the associated n-types continuum economy Ec, then
(S¯, g¯) is a justified objection to x in the finite E , where S¯ = {i ∈ N | µ(S⋂ Ii) > 0}
and g¯i =
1
µ(Si)
∫
Si
g(t)dµ(t), for every i ∈ S¯.
Note that, in particular, we can conclude that if (S, g) is a justified objection
(in the sense of Mas-Colell) to fx in Ec, then so is (S, gˆ), where gˆ(t) = g¯i for
5This remark provides a different way to overcome the weakness (pointed out by Liu and
Liu, 2012) of the related fuzzy bargaining set introduced by Yang, Liu and Liu (2011) for
(transferable utility) cooperative games.
6For more details, see Remark 5 in Mas-Colell (1989). See also the related Lemma 3.4 in
Anderson, Trockel and Zhou (1997).
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every t ∈ Si = S ∩ Ii and every i ∈ S¯.7 We remark that, in the proof of this
Lemma, we just use the corresponding notions of justified objections in E and Ec,
respectively, and we do not use the characterization of justified objections that
Mas-Colell (1989) showed and which can be applied to the associated n-types
continuum economy.
Theorem 3.1 The bargaining set of the finite economy E coincides with the set
of Walrasian allocations.
Enlarging the set of coalitions has a double effect. On the one hand, objecting
is easier and allows for more justified objections which, in turn, would make the
bargaining set smaller. On the other hand, counter-objecting is also easier, which
would eliminate more objections, making it more difficult for the equivalence to
hold. As we have already pointed out, there is still another effect that comes
from the aforementioned fact that if a consumer participates in both an objection
and counter-objection, then an improvement is required in the counter-objection
with respect the objection for such an agent, independently of the participation
rate in the objection. The aggregate effect is therefore not clear, which makes
our equivalence result not trivial.
Let us remember that Dutta et al. (1989) introduced the concept of consis-
tency regarding the bargaining set, going one step further and trying to assess not
only the credibility of the objections but also of the counter-objections involved
in the process. They establish a notion of consistent bargaining set meaning
that each objection in a “chain” of objections is tested (credible) in precisely the
same way as its predecessor. However, the authors recognize that in a context
of an exchange economy with a continuum of agents, the equivalence result by
Mas-Colell (1989) implies that his bargaining set is consistent. Since we provide
an equivalence result , there is also consistency in our bargaining set.
3.3 Justified objections as Walrasian objections
We remark that Theorem 3.1 states that any non Walrasian allocation has a
justified objection. We finish this section by characterizing justified objections
7We stress that when preferences are not strictly convex we cannot ensure that every justified
objection in the n-types continuum economy has the equal-treatment property. However, the
Lemma 3.1 ensures that given a justified objection in Ec, there is also an equal-treatment
justified objection.
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as Walrasian objections. This characterization is a discrete approach to the one
stated by Mas-Colell (1989) for continuum economies. The concept of Walrasian
objection requires the introduction of a price system p, and is based on a self
selection property: members that participate in a coalition in a Walrasian objec-
tion against an allocation are those who would rather trade at the price vector
p than get the consumption bundle they receive by such an allocation. The fol-
lowing notion of Walrasian objection differs from the one by Mas-Colell (1989)
and reflects the differences between BMC(E) and B(E).
Definition 3.2 Let x be an allocation in the finite economy E . An (Aubin) ob-
jection (S, y) to x is said to be Walrasian if there exists a price system p such
that (i) p · v ≥ p · ωi if v %i yi, i ∈ S and (ii) p · v ≥ p · ωi if v %i xi, i /∈ S.
We remark that, under the assumptions of monotonicity and strict positivity
of the endowments, we know that p  0, and therefore conditions (i) and (ii)
above can be written as follows: v i yi implies p · v > p · ωi, for i ∈ S and
v i xi implies p · v > p · ωi for i /∈ S.
Observe that the notion of Walrasian objection in the finite economy E does
not depend explicitly on the rates of participation of the members in the coalition
that objects an allocation. To be precise, in order to check whether the objection
(S, y) is Walrasian, no importance is attached to the degree of participation of
the individuals joining the coalition S that make the allocation y attainable a` la
Aubin; what does become important is the set of consumers who are involved in
the objection.
Proposition 3.1 Let x be a feasible allocation in the finite economy E . Then,
any objection to the allocation x is justified if and only if it is a Walrasian
objection.
The fact that any Walrasian objection is a justified objection in finite eco-
nomies allows us to refine our bargaining-Walras equivalence and its proof in
terms of Walrasian objections. To see this, let x be a feasible allocation in E .
Note that we can now guarantee that if x is not a Walrasian allocation, then
it has a Walrasian objection. Moreover, applying Proposition 3.1, Lemma 3.1
states that if (S, g) is a Walrasian objection (in the sense of Mas-Colell) to fx in
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the associated n-types continuum economy Ec, then (S¯, g¯) is a Walrasian objec-
tion to x in the finite E , where S¯ = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | µ(Si) = µ(S
⋂
Ii) > 0} and
g¯i =
1
µ(Si)
∫
Si
g(t)dµ(t), for every i ∈ S¯.
Let x be a feasible allocation in E and (S, y) an objection to x, being αi the
participation of each i ∈ S. Denote by ES(α) the continuum economy formed only
by consumers of types in S and such that the measure of the set of agents of type
i is αi. From Proposition 3.1, we can deduce that when S = N, the objection
(S, y) is justified if and only if y is a competitive allocation in the restricted
continuum economy EN(α). However, note that in general an objection given by
a coalition S and a competitive allocation of ES(α) is not necessarily a justified
(or Walrasian) objection. Being a Walrasian objection is much more demanding.
We also remark that the fact that (S, y) is a justified objection to x and yi i xi
does not imply αi = 1. This is in contrast to Mas-Colell’s notion for which if a
coalition with a justified objection includes only part of some type of agents then
it is not possible for these agents to strictly improve with the objection.
In short, we stress that, since justified and Walrasian objections coincide,
one can conclude that such a characterization points out that the concept of
Walrasian objection in the finite framework is also more than a technical tool to
refine the bargaining-Walras equivalence.
4 Restricting coalition formation
Both Mas Colell’s (1989) result and our bargaining-Walras equivalence implici-
tly require the formation of all coalitions in the objection and counter-objecting
mechanism. That is, checking whether a given allocation belongs to the bar-
gaining set seems to require contemplating the whole set of possible coalitions
in order to test whether any group of agents, by using their own resources, can
improve upon an allocation either in the objection or counter-objection process.
This will be a complicated task, even when the economy is small, provided that
agents can participate in a coalition with a part of their endowments. Indeed,
the Aubin veto system in a finite economy is equivalent to the blocking scheme
in the associated continuum economy, with a finite number of types, conducted
by equal-treatment allocations.
We also remark that the formation of coalitions may imply some theoreti-
cal difficulties. It is usually argued that the costs, which arise from forming a
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coalition, are not at all negligible. Incompatibilities among different agents may
appear and a large amount of information and communication might be needed
to really form a coalition. Thus, sometimes, it will not suffice to merely say that
several agents constitute a coalition since it may result in high formation costs,
commitments and constraints, which make it difficult to assume that the veto
mechanism underlying cooperative solutions, like the core or the bargaining set,
works freely and spontaneously.
In this section, the difficulty in arguing that coalition formation is costless
leads us to consider a restricted veto mechanism in the procedure leading to the
bargaining set. Thus, we assume that not all the parameters, which specify the
degree of participation of agents when they become members of a coalition, are
admissible. Next we will study the consequences that this assumption has with
regard to the bargaining set solution.
To this end, we consider that a coalition S is defined by the rates of partic-
ipation of its members, which is given by a vector λS = (λi, i ∈ S) ∈ (0, 1]|S|,
where |S| denotes the cardinality of S.
Consider that for each coalition S the participation rates are restricted to
a subset ΛS ⊂ [0, 1]|S|. Let us denote by BΛ(E) (respectively BΛ(E)) the bar-
gaining set where a coalition S can object (respectively counter-object) only
with participation rates in ΛS. When the set of coalitions is restricted in the
objection (respectively counter-objection) process, it becomes harder to block
an allocation (respectively to counter-object an objection) and thus we have
BΛ(E) ⊆ B(E) ⊆ BΛ(E). In addition, if Λ, Λ̂ are such that ΛS ⊆ Λ̂S for every
coalition S, then BΛ(E) ⊆ BΛ̂(E) but BΛ̂(E) ⊆ BΛ(E). Therefore, restricting the
set of coalitions which are able to object enlarges the bargaining set, whereas re-
stricting the coalition formation in the counter-objection mechanism diminishes
the bargaining set. This is so because when not all the coalitions can take part in
the bargaining mechanism, on the one hand, blocking is harder but on the other
hand, it is easier for an admissible objection to become credible or justified.
In the case of continuum economies, following Schmeidler (1972), we can
interpret the measure of a coalition as the amount of (or cost of) information
and communication needed in order to form such a coalition. Consequently, it
may be meaningful to consider those coalitions whose size converges to zero; that
is, the coalitions with small formation cost. We apply this argument to economies
with a finite number of agents where the veto system in the sense of Aubin is
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considered. To this effect, given δ ∈ (0, 1], let δ-B(E) denote the bargaining set
of the economy E where the participation rate of any agent in any coalition, both
in the objection and counter-objection procedure, is restricted to be less or equal
than δ.
The next result is related to the remark on the core of atomless economies
stated by Schmeilder (1972), showing that in order to obtain the core of a con-
tinuum economy, it is enough to consider the blocking power of arbitrarily small
coalitions.
Lemma 4.1 All the δ-bargaining sets are equal and coincide with the bargaining
set in the finite economy E . That is, δ-B(E) = B(E), for every δ ∈ (0, 1].
The above result is in contrast to the work by Schjødt and Sloth (1994) who
showed that, in continuum economies, when one restricts the coalitions partic-
ipating in objections and counter-objections to those whose size is arbitrarily
small, then the Mas-Colell bargaining set becomes strictly larger than the ori-
ginal one.8 In other words, in atomless economies and contrary to the core, the
formation of only arbitrarily small coalitions in the bargaining process does not
allow the characterization of the competitive allocations. This is due to the fact
that limiting the size of coalitions in continuum economies prevents obtaining
justified objections. This is not the case in economies with a finite number of
agents when one restricts the participation rates of members forming a coalition
to those arbitrarily small. Thus, the previous lemma marks a further contrast
between Mas-Collel’s bargaining set for continuum economies and our finite ap-
proach.
Symmetrically to Schmeidler’s (1972) and Grodal’s (1972)9 core character-
izations for atomless economies, Vind (1972) showed that in order to block any
non-competitive allocation it is enough to consider the veto power of arbitrarily
large coalitions. This result allows us to show that in order to obtain the Aubin
8Moreover, Herve´s-Este´vez and Moreno-Garc´ıa (2015) show that, in order to obtain the
Mas-Colell bargaining set in atomless economies, it is not possible to restrict coalitions in the
objection process, independently of the kind of restriction we consider. In particular, it is shown
the impossibility of restricting to arbitrarily small or large coalitions to obtain a Mas-Colell
justified objection.
9Grodal extended Schmeidler’s result by showing that, given δ ∈ (0, 1), the blocking coali-
tions can be restricted to those with measure less than δ that are also union of at most ` + 1
subcoalitions with diameter less than δ.
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core the formation of only one coalition is sufficient, namely, the big coalition,
which is formed by all the agents in the economy; moreover, for every consumer
the endowment participation rate can be chosen to be arbitrarily close to one,
i.e., the parameters defining the degree of joining in the big coalition can be
restricted to those close to the total participation (see Herve´s-Beloso and Moreno-
Garc´ıa, 2001 and Herve´s-Beloso, Moreno-Garc´ıa and Yannelis, 2005). The next
example shows that this restriction on coalition formation cannot be adapted to
the bargaining set solution we address.
Example 1. Let E be an economy with two consumers who trade two commo-
dities, a and b. Both agents have the same preference relation represented by the
utility function U(a, b) = ab, and both are initially endowed with one unit of
each commodity. Let us consider the feasible allocation x which assigns the bun-
dle x1 = (2, 2) to the individual 1 and the bundle x2 = (0, 0) to individual 2.
The allocation x does not belong to the bargaining set (it does not belong to
the core and it is not a Walrasian allocation). In fact, x is blocked in the sense
of Aubin by S = {2} with any participation rate λ ∈ (0, 1]. Moreover, every
objection ({2}, (1, 1)), with any λ ∈ (0, 1], has no counter-objection a` la Aubin
and, therefore, is justified.
Note that there exists y such that the coalition {1, 2} objects x in the sense
of Aubin via y = (y1, y2), with strictly positive weights. That is, there ex-
ists (λ1, λ2) ∈ (0, 1]2 such that λ1y1 + λ2y2 ≤ (λ1 + λ2)(1, 1). In addition,
U(y1) ≥ 4 and U(y2) ≥ 0, with at least one strict inequality. This implies that
U(y2) < U(ω2) = 1. Therefore, any objection where the participation parameters
are restricted to be strictly positive for every consumer is counter-objected by
individual 2.
We conclude that in contrast to the Aubin core, we cannot restrict the coali-
tion formation to the grand coalition with parameters close enough to the total
participation. Next we state a similar example showing that we cannot state
such a restriction in the counter-objecting mechanism either.
Example 2. Let E be an economy with three consumers who trade two
commodities, a and b. All the agents have the same preference relation repre-
sented by the utility function U(a, b) = ab, and are initially endowed with one
unit of each commodity. Let us consider the feasible allocation x which assigns
the bundle x1 = (3, 3) to individual 1 and the bundle x2 = x3 = (0, 0) to individu-
als 2 and 3. The allocation x is blocked in the sense of Aubin by S = {2} with any
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participation rate λ ∈ (0, 1]. Note also that ({3}, (1, 1)) is a counter-objection to
the objection ({2}, (1, 1)) . However, there is no counter-objection to ({2}, (1, 1))
if all the participation rates are required to be, for instance, larger than 1/2.10
To see this, assume that {1, 2, 3} counter-objects, with weights λi, i = 1, 2, 3.
Given the preference relations, we can conclude that 3λ1 + λ2 < λ1 + λ2 + λ3.
We obtain a contradiction with the fact that λ1, λ3 ∈ (1/2, 1].
To finish this section, we consider a quite different restriction for the partici-
pation rates of the agents in coalitions. As the following lemma states, it turns
out that the bargaining set is entirely characterized when the participation rates
of agents in coalitions involved in counter-objections are rational numbers.
Lemma 4.2 Let BQ(E) denote the bargaining set of the economy E where only
rational numbers are allowed as participation rates in the counter-objection pro-
cess. Then, BQ(E) = B(E).
The restriction in the previous lemma is equivalent to the veto mechanism
in the sequence of replicated economies with equal treatment allocations. Then,
we conclude that an Aubin objection (S, y) to x is justified if and only if the
allocation (feasible or not) which assigns yi to agents of type i ∈ S and xi to
agents of type i ∈ N \ S is not objected in any replicated economy.
We remark that, taking into account the observations on restricting coalition
formation in the previous section, Lemma 4.2 can be obtained as an immediate
consequence of our bargaining-Walras equivalence. However, in the Appendix
we provide a proof which does not use the equality W (E) = B(E).
5 Final additional characterizations
Given our equivalence results, any characterization of Walrasian equilibrium for
finite economies turns immediately into an additional characterization of the bar-
gaining set. In this section we pick up two different ways of identifying Walrasian
allocations and recast them in terms of bargaining sets as corollaries.
First, let us consider a feasible allocation x = (x1, . . . , xn) in the economy
E . Following Herve´s-Beloso, Moreno-Garc´ıa and Yannelis (2005a, 2005b), we
10The same remains true if the parameters are required to be larger than any number in
(1/2, 1).
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define a family of economies denoted by E(a, x), a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ [0, 1]n, which
coincide with E except for the endowments that, for each agent i ∈ N , are
defined by ωi(a, x) = aixi + (1− ai)ωi. An allocation (feasible or not ) is said to
be dominated in the economy E if it is blocked by the grand coalition N.
In the aforementioned works it was proved that, under the assumptions we
have considered, an allocation x is Walrasian in the economy E if and only if it is
not dominated in any perturbed economy E(a, x). This characterization allows
us to write the next corollary as an immediate consequence of the bargaining-
Walras equivalence we have obtained in Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 5.1 An allocation x belongs to the bargaining set of E (equivalently,
to the leader bargaining set of every replicated economy rE) if and only if it is
not dominated in any economy E(a, x).
An alternative way of stating the above result is: The allocation x has a
justified objection (equivalently, a Walrasian objection) in the economy E if and
only if x is blocked by the grand coalition in some economy E(a, x).
The essence of the second characterization of Walrasian equilibrium that we
recast for bargaining sets differs substantially from the previous ones. It fol-
lows a non-cooperative game theoretical approach and provides insights into the
mechanism through which the bargaining process is conducted.
Given the finite economy E = (IR`+,%i, ωi, i ∈ N), let us define an associated
game G as follows. There are two players. The strategy sets for the players are
given by:
S1 = { x = (x1, ..., xn) ∈ IR`n+ such that xi 6= 0 and
∑n
i=1 xi ≤
∑n
i=1 ωi}.
S2 = {(a, y) ∈ [α, 1]n × IR`n+ such that
∑n
i=1 aiyi ≤
∑n
i=1 aiωi},
where α is a real number such that 0 < α < 1.
Given a strategy profile s = (x, (a, y)) ∈ S1 × S2, the payoff functions Π1 and
Π2, for player 1 and 2, respectively, are defined as Π1(x, (a, y)) = mini{Ui(xi)−
Ui(yi)} and Π2(x, (a, y)) = mini{ai (Ui(yi)− Ui(xi))}.
Note that if Π2(x, (a, y)) > 0, then the allocation x is blocked via y by the big
coalition being ai the participation rate of each consumer i. Actually, player 2
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gets a positive payoff if and only if the big coalition objects in the sense of Aubin
the allocation proposed by player 1.
As an immediate consequence of our bargaining-Walras equivalence and The-
orem 4.1 in Herve´s-Beloso and Moreno-Garc´ıa (2009), we obtain the following
corollary.
Corollary 5.2 x belongs to the bargaining set of the economy E , if and only if
(x, (b, x)) with bi = b, for every i = 1, . . . , n, ( for instance (x, (1, x)) ) is a Nash
equilibrium for the game G.
To finish, we remark that the spirit of the bargaining set notions we have
considered seems to indicate that additional and finer characterizations for such
cooperative concepts could be obtained through non-cooperative solutions of dif-
ferent games, in which a player represents the objection system whereas another
one is in charge of the counter-objection mechanism. This is part of our further
research.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Let us assume that fx is objected by (S, g) meaning that:∫
S
g(t)dµ(t) ≤ ∫
S
ω(t)dµ(t), g %t fx for every t ∈ S and µ ({t ∈ S|g t fx}) > 0.
Let Si = S ∩ Ii and S¯ = {i ∈ N |µ(Si) > 0}. Since S blocks fx via g, we have
that there exists a type k ∈ N and a set A ⊂ Sk = S ∩ Ik, with µ(A) > 0, such
that g(t) k fx, for every t ∈ A.
Let g¯ be the allocation given by g¯i =
1
µ(Si)
∫
Si
g(t)dµ(t), for every i ∈ S¯. Then,
by convexity of the preferences, we have g¯i %i xi = fx(t) for every t ∈ Si =
S ∩ Ii and i ∈ S¯; and g¯k k xk = fx(t) for every t ∈ Sk.11 Thus, (S¯, g¯) is an
objection a` la Aubin to the allocation x in the economy E , since we have that:
(i)
∑
i∈S¯ µ(Si)g¯i ≤
∑
i∈S¯ µ(Si)ωi, (ii) g¯i %i xi for every i ∈ S¯ and (iii) there
exists k ∈ S¯ such that g¯k k xk.
Assume that the objection (S¯, g¯) has a counter-objection (T¯ , z), that is, there
exists {λi}i∈T¯ with λi ∈ (0, 1] for every i ∈ T¯ , such that: (i)
∑
i∈T¯ λizi ≤∑
i∈T¯ λiωi, (ii) zi i g¯i for every i ∈ T¯ ∩ S¯ and (iii) zi i xi for every i ∈ T¯ \ S¯.
11See the Lemma in Garc´ıa-Cutr´ın and Herve´s-Beloso (1993) for further details.
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If T¯ ∩ S¯ = ∅ then, in the associated continuum economy Ec, any coalition
T =
⋃
i∈T¯ Ti ⊂ I with µ(Ti) = λi, counter-objects the objection (S, g) via the
allocation fz given by fz(t) = zi for every t ∈ Ti. Otherwise (i.e., T¯ ∩ S¯ 6= ∅),
from the previous condition (ii) we can deduce that for every i ∈ T¯ ∩ S¯, there
exists Ai ⊂ Si with µ(Ai) > 0, such that zi i g(t) for every t ∈ Ai. This is again
a consequence of the convexity property of preferences. Let a = min{µ(Ai), i ∈
T¯ ∩ S¯} and take M large enough such that αi = λiM ≤ a for every i ∈ T¯ .
Consider a coalition T ⊂ I in the continuum economy Ec with T = ∪i∈T¯Ti,
such that Ti ⊂ Ai, if i ∈ T¯ ∩ S¯; Ti ⊂ Ii, if i ∈ T¯ \ S¯ and µ(Ti) = αi, for every
i ∈ T¯ . Then, defining the step function h as h(t) = zi if t ∈ Ti, we have that: (i)∫
T
h(t)dµ(t) =
∑
i∈T¯ αizi ≤
∑
i∈T¯ αiωi =
∫
T
ω(t)dµ(t), (ii) h(t) i g(t) for every
t ∈ Ti with i ∈ T¯ ∩ S¯; and (iii) h(t) i xi = fx(t) for every t ∈ Ti with i ∈ T¯ \ S¯.
Note that (ii) and (ii) mean h(t) t g(t) for every t ∈ T ∩S and h(t) t fx(t)
for every t ∈ T \ S, respectively. In other words, we have constructed a counter-
objection (T, h) for the objection (S, g), which concludes the proof.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Since the Aubin core coincides with the set of
Walrasian allocations for the economy E (see Aubin, 1979), we have that any
Walrasian allocation has no objection in the sense of Aubin and therefore belongs
to the bargaining set of E .
Let us show that B(E) ⊆ W (E). Consider an allocation x ∈ B(E) and the step
function12 fx which is a feasible allocation in the associated n-types continuum
economy Ec. It suffices to show that fx belongs to the Mas-Colell bargaining set
of Ec.13 Let us assume that fx is blocked by the coalition S via the allocation
g in Ec and that (S, g) is a justified objection to fx in the sense of Mas-Colell.
By Lemma 3.1 we can ensure that (S¯, g¯) is a justified objection to x in E , where
g¯i =
1
µ(Si)
∫
Si
g(t)dµ(t), for every i ∈ S¯ = {i ∈ N | µ(S ∩ Ii) > 0}. This is in
contradiction to the fact that x ∈ B(E) and concludes the proof.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Let (S, y) be an objection a` la Aubin to x. Assume
12For every t ∈ [0, 1], fx(t) = xi if t ∈ Ii
13This is so because the Mas-Colell bargaining set of Ec equals the set of competitive al-
locations (Mas-Colell, 1989), which is also equivalent to the core (Aumann, 1964), and fx is
competitive in Ec if and only if x is Walrasian in E .
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(T, z) is a counter-objection in the sense of Aubin to (S, y). Then, there exist
coefficients λi ∈ (0, 1] for each i ∈ T , such that:
∑
i∈T λizi ≤
∑
i∈T λiωi; zi i yi
for every i ∈ T ∩ S and zi i xi for every i ∈ T \ S. Since (S, y) is a Walrasian
objection at prices p we have that p·zi > p·ωi, for every i ∈ T∩S and p·zi > p·ωi,
for every i ∈ T \ S. This implies p ·∑i∈T λizi > p ·∑i∈T λiωi, which contradicts
that z is attainable by T with weights λi, i ∈ T. Thus, we conclude that (S, y) is
a justified objection.
To show the converse, let (S, y) be a justified objection to x and let a =
(a1, . . . , an) be an allocation (not necessarily feasible) such that ai = yi if i ∈ S
and ai = xi if i /∈ S. For every consumer i define Γi = {z ∈ IR`|z+ωi %i ai}
⋃{0}
and let Γ be the convex hull of the union of the sets Γi, i ∈ N.
Let us show that Γ
⋂
(−IR`++) is empty. Assume that δ ∈ Γ
⋂
(−IR`++). Then,
there is λ = (λi, i ∈ N) ∈ [0, 1]n, with
∑n
i=1 λi = 1, such that δ =
∑n
i=1 λizi ∈ Γ.
This implies that the coalition T = {j ∈ N | λj > 0} counter-objects (S, y) via
the allocation zˆ where zˆi = zi + ωi − δ for each i ∈ T. Indeed,
∑
j∈T λj zˆj =∑
j∈T λjωj. Moreover, since zi ∈ Γi for every i ∈ T and δ  0, by monotonicity
of preferences, zˆi i yi for every i ∈ T ∩ S and zˆi i xi for every i ∈ T \ S. This
is a contradiction.
Thus, Γ
⋂
(−IR`++) = ∅, which implies that 0 is a frontier point of Γ. There-
fore, there exists a hyperplane that supports Γ at 0. That is, there exists a
price system p such that p · z ≥ 0 for every z ∈ Γ. This means that p · v ≥
p · ωi, if v %i ai. Therefore, we conclude that (S, y) is a Walrasian objection.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Let an allocation y be attainable for a coalition S
with participation rates λi, i ∈ S. That is,
∑
i∈S λiyi ≤
∑
i∈S λiωi. It suffices
to note that there exists (αi, i ∈ S), with αi ≤ δ for every i ∈ S such that∑
i∈S αiyi ≤
∑
i∈S αiωi. To see this, letM be large enough so that αi = λi/M ≤ δ,
for every i ∈ S. Thus, the same allocation y is also attainable for the same
coalition S with participation rates arbitrarily small. The same reasoning holds
for the case of both objections and counter-objections.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. Let x be a feasible allocation and (S, y) an objection
to x. Let (T, z) be a counter-objection to (S, y). This means that there exist
coefficients αi, i ∈ T , such that (i)
∑
i∈T αizi =
∑
i∈T αiωi and (ii) zi i yi for
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every i ∈ T ∩ S, and zi i xi for every i ∈ T \ S.
For every natural k ∈ IN, we define aki , i ∈ T , as the smallest integer greater
than or equal to kαi. Let us denote z
k
i =
kαi
aki
(zi − ωi) + ωi. Since lim
k→∞
zki = zi
for every i ∈ T, by continuity of preferences, we have that zki i yi for every
i ∈ T ∩ S and zki i xi for every i ∈ T \ S, for all k large enough.
By construction, we have
∑
i∈T a
k
i (z
k
i − ωi) = 0. Denoting qki = a
k
i∑
i∈T a
k
i
we
obtain (i)
∑
i∈T q
k
i z
k
i =
∑
i∈T q
k
i ωi and (ii) z
k
i i yi for every i ∈ T ∩ S, and
zki i xi for every i ∈ T \ S, for all k large enough.
Q.E.D.
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